The knee-jerk interpretation to this disclosure (and others) is that China is a powerhouse of cyber espionage capable of stealing whatever secrets they want and that the U.S. is powerless to stop them. This seems very unlikely.This is just silly. Who does the author thinks will pay money for the stolen information - the designs of the F-35, the Littoral warship, the anti-missile defenses? Hello? Bueller?
Last week, the New York Times ran a piece which delved into China's hacker culture, revealing a disparate band of private contractors and not a team of highly trained hackers operating in lock-step with the government.
"Another former hacker said the monolithic notion of insidious, state-sponsored hacking now discussed in the West was absurd," wrote Edward Wong for the Times. "The presence of the state throughout the economy means hackers often end up doing work for the government at some point, even if it is through something as small-scale as a contract with a local government office."
Some of these pilfered secrets have made their way back to the central Chinese government, but it's just as likely that they were taken by individuals or companies and then sold to someone else. As is the case with other forms of cybercrime, the hackers are generally trying to make money off the information, not use it themselves.
Just because you don't have a Ministry Of Cyber Espionage with a tony building in downtown Beijing, does anyone think that it's remotely plausible that there isn't a market for that sort of information? Or that the People's Liberation Army isn't the top buyer for that sort of information? Who does he think is paying for it - Anonymous?
And so the entire article is silly. It makes a distinction that lacks a difference. Of course the Chinese government is behind this. It makes no difference whatsoever whether it was directly via the Ministry of H4X0rz or by a revenue trail leading to chinese h4x0rz. Macht nichts.
And please no whinging that the Red Chinese are not our enemies, and is actually a friendly government. Again, that's a distinction without a difference. The old saying is true here: there are friendly foreign governments, but there are no friendly foreign Intelligence Agencies.
6 comments:
If you've got access to a library that carries them, the Dragon series by Timothy L Thomas of the Foreign Military Studies Office are enlightening reads. He lays out a historical and cultural perspective of the Chinese IW program.
Considering that they teach it in schools, that article is just plain BS...
A friend of mine spent 12 years in China as a manager for a software company that produced an OS to replicate Microsoft (and make it work right). They effectively had ONE customer ... the national and regional governments.
This is what passes for legitimate business in China.
In the course of running his part of the business he had the opportunity to interview and hire people with extensive training and expertise in security. Not in providing or managing security but in breaking secure systems and in creating malware. In China this is a field of study and a career option. Besides the horde of students who do it for fun.
The author's viewpoint ignores the history of how the Chinese have always done business.
Previously, the Chinese stole technology by mastering reverse engineering. They were able to do so by simply requesting engineering specs upon first purchase. By the time business caught on, (or cared) they efficiently move on to hard drive theft.
Further consider the genesis of Chinese government's control of all purchases, and manufacturing from the start of this game
Well, at least the title of the magazine doesn't need to change to reflect their Politically Correct stance on this.
When did China become a Western democracy? As far as I know, China still operates on the principle that what is not specifically permitted is forbidden.
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